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Abstract—This paper investigates a secure wireless-powered
device-to-device (D2D) communication network in the presence
of multiple eavesdroppers, where a hybrid base station (BS)
in a cellular network not only provides power wirelessly for
the D2D transmitter to guarantee power efficiency for the D2D
network, but also serves as a cooperative jammer (CJ) to interfere
with the eavesdroppers. The cellular and D2D networks can
belong to different service providers, which means that the D2D
transmitter would need to pay for the energy service released
by the hybrid BS to guarantee secure D2D communication. In
order to exploit the hierarchical interaction between the BS and
the D2D transmitter, we first formulate a Stackelberg game based
energy trading scheme, where the quadratic energy cost model is
considered. Then, a non-energy trading based Stackelberg game
is investigated to study the reversed roles of the BS and the
D2D users. For comparison, we also formulate and resolve the
social welfare optimization problem. We derive the closed-form
Stackelberg equilibriums of the formulated games and the optimal
solutions for the social welfare optimization problem. Simulation
results are provided to validate our proposed schemes to highlight
the importance of energy trading interaction between cellular and
D2D networks.
Index Terms—Wireless powered communication networks
(WPCNs), physical-layer secrecy, device-to-device (D2D), coop-
erative jammer (CJ), Stackelberg game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Device-to-device (D2D) communications, which was stan-
dardized by the 3GPP release 12 [2], [3], has been re-
cently receiving increasing research interests as one of the
driving technologies for 5G networks. The key feature of
D2D communication is that two communicating devices in
close proximity reuse better links to communicate directly
rather than through a base station (BS) in cellular networks
[4]. The D2D communication based mobile proximity offers
new mobile service opportunities and the potential to reduce
traffic load on the network. The advantages of the D2D
communications are multi-fold: relieving the burden of the
BS, enhancing spectral efficiency, shortening time delay, and
reducing power consumption to keep up with the “greener”
trend. D2D communication is also supposed to serve well in
the urgent scenarios for providing public safety and disaster
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relief services [5]–[7]. Recent information-theoretical results
have indicated that the combination of caching on the users’
devices and D2D communication leads to throughput scala-
bility for very dense networks, see e.g., [8] and references
therein. Hence, D2D caching networks have been considered
as one of promising paradigms in [8], [9], where it is advocated
that “helper” nodes are densely disseminated in a coverage
area to serve the users’ demands using their own large cached
information. However, the works in [8] and [9] have implicitly
assumed infinite power supply for helper nodes. Unfortunately,
the infinite-power-supply assumption is not always practical
for D2D transceivers.
To tackle the aforementioned problem, energy harvesting
D2D networks have been considered as a promising solu-
tion to provide energy for the D2D transceivers [10]. Since
energy can be harvested from ambient radio frequency (RF)
signals with reasonable efficiency over small distances, RF
energy harvesting can be adopted for D2D communications.
Therefore, wireless energy transfer (WET) techniques have
attracted increasing research interests to prolong the bat-
tery lifetime of energy-constrained wireless networks [11],
[12]. In particular, research efforts have been focusing on
the establishment of wireless-powered communication net-
works (WPCNs), in which wireless transceivers are wirelessly
charged by the power transmitters [13], [14]. Unlike traditional
battery-powered networks, WPCN can effectively reduce the
operational cost by avoiding the need to replace or recharge
batteries. Also, the energy released by the WPCN is adjustable
in providing a stable energy supply to satisfy different physical
conditions and service requirements [14]. In WPCNs, a well-
known protocol, named “harvest-then-transmit”, was proposed
in [15], where wireless users first harvest energy from RF sig-
nals broadcast by a hybrid access-point (AP) in the downlink
(DL), and then use the harvested energy to send information
to the AP in the uplink (UL). State-of-the-art cooperative
protocols for WPCNs can be found in [16]–[18]. The authors
of [19] and [20] proposed a dedicated WET network where
multiple power beacons (PBs) are deployed near a wireless
information transfer (WIT) network to provide energy services
to the wireless terminals, i.e., D2D transceivers, of the WIT
network.
On the other development, physical layer security, which
differs from the conventional cryptographic methods devel-
oped in the network layer, has recently attracted significant
research efforts, see e.g., [21]–[24]. Physical layer security has
been initially defined in wiretap channel based on information-
theoretical aspects [21], [22]. In physical layer security, a
better channel of a legitimate user, compared with that of an
eavesdropper, is exploited to guarantee secure transmissions
for the legitimate user, i.e., to guarantee a positive secrecy
rate which is defined as the mutual information difference
between the legitimate user and the eavesdropper. To improve
the secrecy rate, multi-antenna wiretap channels have been
investigated to take the advantage of having the additional
degrees of freedom (DoF) and diversity gains [23], [24]. Most
of existing techniques aim to introduce more interference to
degrade the channels of eavesdroppers, i.e., artificial noise
(AN) [25]–[27] and cooperative jammer (CJ) [28]. In [29],
a semidefinite programming (SDP) approach was adopted
for multiple-input single-output (MISO) secure channels to
guarantee reliable communications by solving either power
minimization subject to secrecy constraint or secrecy rate max-
imization subject to power constraint. An AN-assisted transmit
optimization has been presented in [25], where the spatially
selective AN embedded with secure transmit beamformer was
designed to obtain the optimal power allocation. In [28], a
scheme that utilizes a CJ signal sent by an external node is
considered. The CJ signal is used to introduce interference to
the eavesdroppers in order to achieve the required achievable
secrecy rate for a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO)
secrecy channel. In [28], [30], [31], several designs were
proposed with an assumption that a legitimate transmitter pays
a price to a private CJ for its jamming services to guarantee the
secure communications. A Stackelberg game was employed to
obtain the optimal power allocation in [28], [31]. In addition,
outage probability is a key indicator to show secrecy perfor-
mance when only statistical channel state information (CSI) is
available. In [27], [32], [33], outage secrecy rate optimizations
were formulated based on the uncertainty model of statistical
channels, where Bernstein-type inequality [34] is adopted to
solve the formulated problems.
As an emerging application of D2D communications, a new
cellular network architecture is proposed to integrate energy
harvesting technologies and social networking characteristics
into D2D communications for local data dissemination in [35].
In D2D caching and social networks, the need for secrecy
protection arises as on-demand broadcasting normally requires
a subscription, which means unsubscribed users will not be
able to access the content that they do not pay for. Thus,
security communications should be considered in the D2D
networks. To that end, physical layer security techniques have
been adopted in D2D communications, where secure commu-
nications can be guaranteed such that confidential information
is reliably transmitted between a dedicated D2D pair [36]–
[39]. In [36], [37], the authors proposed a novel cooperation
mechanism between the cellular and D2D networks, which
was formulated as a coalition game. In addition, a merge-
and-split-based coalition formation algorithm is proposed to
achieve efficient cooperation such that one can improve the
secrecy rate and social welfare. In [38], the optimal joint
power control solutions of both the cellular communication
links and D2D pairs have been derived in terms of secrecy
capacity. In [39], the D2D network plays a CJ role to interfere
with the eavesdroppers for the improvement of the security
in cellular networks. On the other hand, the power signal
in a dedicated WET for transferring wireless power, can be
employed to guarantee the secrecy communications in WIT
such that physical layer security techniques can be naturally
applied to the secure WPCNs [40]. The interaction between
WET and security services plays an important role to the
performance of the network, particularly when the WET sup-
plier and the WIT users belong to different service providers.
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no existing
work investigating this energy interaction in secure wireless-
powered D2D communications.
In this paper, we investigate a secure wireless-powered
CJ-aided D2D communication system, where a hybrid BS
plays two roles: WET and CJ-aided secure WIT. In addition,
the D2D secure communication is established by using the
harvested energy. The WET and CJ-aided secure WIT are
performed in two phases: i) the BS is considered as a power
source (PS) which transfers the power to the D2D transmitter
in the first phase, and ii) the D2D transmitter employs the
harvested energy to transmit the information signal while the
BS acts as a CJ to enhance the secrecy performance. Unlike
the existing work [19], where the WET and WIT networks are
assumed to belong to the same service provider, in this paper,
we consider a more general and complete case where these
two networks may or may not belong to the same operators.1
In this case, energy prices will be paid by the D2D transmitter
for the wireless charging services to guarantee the secure
transmission. We propose three different schemes to exploit
the energy interaction between the BS and the D2D transmitter
to achieve optimal power allocation for the cellular network
while guaranteeing security for D2D communications. In the
following, we highlight our contributions:
1) Energy trading based Stackelberg game: We first con-
sider the wireless charging model as an energy trading
process, which is defined as the hierarchical energy in-
teraction between the BS and the D2D transmitter. This
model facilitates the derivation of the optimal power
allocation policies for the D2D devices and the BS. In
particular, we take into account strategic behaviours of
the hybrid BS and the D2D transmitter and formulate
this energy trading process as a Stackelberg game. The
D2D transmitter plays the leader role2 that purchases
energy from the BS’s wireless power transfer service.
In this game, the leader optimizes the energy price
that it needs to pay and the amount of time allocated
for energy harvesting to maximize its utility function,
which is defined as the difference between the achievable
secrecy throughput, i.e., the equivalent revenue, and
its total payment to the BS. Meanwhile, the BS is
modelled as the follower that decides its optimal power
transfer policy based on the energy price offered by the
leader to maximize its own profit, which is defined as
the difference between the payment received from the
1In the case of different operators, we assume that the WET service is
provided by one service provider, e.g., an energy supplier, while the WIT
service is provided by another provider, e.g., a telecommunication supplier.
Both of service providers belong to different authorities.
2As a customer, it can dictate the market by deciding what energy price
that it is willing to pay and therefore it fits well with the role of the leader
in this trading game.
D2D transmitter and the energy production cost. The
Stackelberg equilibrium of the game is then achieved
via closed form solutions (for the BS’s transmit power
policy and the D2D transmitter’s energy price) or via
numerical search (for time allocation of the energy
harvesting).
2) Non-energy trading based Stackelberg game: Next, we
consider a non-energy trading based game-theoretical
scheme. The nature of non-trading strategy is that the
energy seller, i.e, the BS, decides the energy price and
the amount of time for energy transfer service. There is
no room for the customer, i.e., the D2D transmitter, to
negotiate the price. To reflect this, the BS now plays the
leader role, who dictates the situation, in the Stackelberg
game. The D2D transmitter is now modelled as the
follower who determines the level of power transfer
required from the BS. The closed form solutions are
achieved for the optimal energy price and transmit power
in this game.
3) Social welfare optimization scheme: Finally, we formu-
late and solve a corresponding social welfare optimiza-
tion scheme in order to evaluate the impact of the self-
interested behaviours of the hybrid BS that is present
in the energy trading based Stackelberg game. In this
scheme, the hybrid BS is considered to cooperate with
the D2D transmitter to maximize the social welfare
which is defined as the difference between the utility
function achieved from the achievable secrecy through-
put of the D2D transmitter and the BS’s energy cost
presented by a quadratic model. We derive the closed-
form solution for the BS transmit power allocation,
while the optimal energy transfer time allocation can
be achieved by numerical search.
The rest of of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the secure wireless-powered D2D system model.
Section III proposes the game theoretical and social welfare
optimization schemes. Numerical results are provided to val-
idate the proposed schemes in Section IV. Finally, Section V
concludes the paper.
Notations: We use the upper case boldface letters for ma-
trices and lower case boldface letters for vectors. ‖ · ‖ denotes
the Euclidean norm of a vector. [x]+ represents max{x, 0}.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, a secure wireless-powered D2D communi-
cation, shown in Fig. 1, is considered. The communication
scenario considered consists of a cellular hybrid BS, a D2D
pair,3 and multiple eavesdroppers. A secure D2D communica-
tion link is established between the D2D pair in the presence of
K multiple eavesdroppers. In addition, a multi-antenna hybrid
BS in the cellular network is employed to provide power for
the D2D transmitter to guarantee the secure communications,
and also to introduce jamming signals to interfere with the
3The D2D pair utilizes the same frequency of the cellular network in
underlay mode. We ignore the D2D interference to the cellular network by
assuming the D2D interference to be lower than the interference tolerance of
the cellular network.
eavesdroppers. We assume that the D2D transmitter has no
embedded power supply available and needs to be powered
from the RF signals transmitted by the hybrid BS, which serves
as a stable and reliable energy provider. We assume that the
BS is powered constantly by a national grid or a micro grid.
Moreover, the “harvest-then-transmit” protocol is considered
during a time period T , shown in Fig. 1, which is divided into
two parts: (a) Wireless energy transfer (WET), i.e., in the time
period of θT (0 < θ < 1), the BS provides power for the
D2D transmitter by transmitting the RF signals; (b) Wireless
information transfer and cooperative jamming (WITCJ), i.e.,
in the (1 − θ)T time period, the D2D transmitter employs
the harvested energy to send information signals to the D2D
receiver, and meanwhile, the BS transmits jamming signal to
interfere with the eavesdroppers to enhance the secrecy rate.
Without any loss of generality, we assume that T = 1 in this
paper. It is assumed that the D2D pair and all eavesdroppers
are equipped with a single antenna, while the hybrid BS is
equipped with NT transmit antennas. Let hs and he,k denote
the channel coefficients between the D2D transmitter and the
D2D receiver as well as the k-th eavesdropper, respectively.
Furthermore, let h ∈ C1×NT , gs ∈ C1×NT and ge,k ∈ C1×NT
be the channel coefficients between the BS and the D2D
transmitter, the D2D receiver, as well as the k-th eavesdropper,
respectively. During the WET phase, the BS employs the
Fig. 1: System model.
energy beamforming w along with the direction of h, which
can be written as w = h‖h‖ . Thus, the harvested energy at the
D2D transmitter is given by
Es = ξθPBS‖h‖2, (1)
where ξ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the energy harvesting efficiency of
the D2D transmitter, and PBS is the transmit power at the
BS. Thus, the maximum transmit power available for the D2D
transmitter during the (1− θ)T time period can be written as
pmaxs =
Es
1− θ =
ξθPBS‖h‖2
1− θ . (2)
During the WITCJ phase, while the secure communication
is established between the D2D pair, the jamming signal is
introduced by the BS to interfere the eavesdroppers. In order to
confuse any potential eavesdroppers except the D2D receiver,
the jamming signal is generated in the null space of the
channel coefficients between the BS and the D2D user gs, i.e.,
gsz = 0, where z = Tv is the jamming beamforming vector,
T ∈ CNT×(NT−1) is the orthogonal basis of the null space of
gs, and v is a (NT − 1) jamming signal vector with entries
being independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) CN (0, 1)
variables. In this paper, we assume that the jamming power
(also equals to PBS) is uniformly distributed among theNT−1
dimensions. Based on the above analysis and assumption, the
instantaneous channel capacity at the D2D receiver and the
k-th eavesdropper can be, respectively, written as
Cs = log
(
1 +
ps|hs|2
σ2s
)
, (3)
and
Ce,k = log
(
1 +
ps|he,k|2
PBS
NT−1
‖ge,kT‖2 + σ2e
)
, (4)
where ps is the transmit power at the D2D transmitter,
σ2s = σ
2
I + σ
2
n, σ
2
I is the interference power from cellular
network,4 and σ2n and σ
2
e are the noise variances of additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the D2D receiver and the k-
th eavesdropper, respectively. Without loss of generality, the
worst case scenario is considered in this paper, where it is
assumed that σ2e = 0. Thus, the secrecy capacity can be written
as
C = [Cs −max
k
Ce,k]
+. (5)
In addition, the secrecy rate R in this paper is defined as
the difference between communication rate of main channel
Rs (Rs ≤ Cs) and the maximum eavesdropping rate, i.e.,
maxk∈[1,K]Re,k, which is given by
Re = max
k∈[1,K]
Re,k = log(1 + ρe), (6)
where ρe ≥ 0 denotes the associated signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) threshold for the eavesdroppers.5 Thus, the secrecy rate
for the D2D network can be expressed as
R = Rs −Re = Rs − log(1 + ρe). (7)
It is noted that Rs should satisfy Rs ≤ Cs to guarantee reliable
transmissions, which implies that Rs is upper-bounded by Cs.
In order to maximize R, we consider Rs = Cs, and thus
R = Cs − log(1 + ρe). (8)
Due to the randomness of the eavesdroppers’ channels, it is
difficult to estimate the accuracy CSI of the eavesdroppers.
In this case, we assume that the D2D transmitter only knows
statistical CSI of the eavesdroppers. Under this assumption, the
secrecy outage probability is considered as a secrecy metric,
which is defined as follows:
pout = Pr{Cs −max
k
Ce,k < R}. (9)
4It is assumed that the interference from cellular network is an ergodic
process, i.e., the statistical average can be estimated by averaging over time,
and D2D user can estimate the interference power σ2
I
. For the detailed
discussion on interference modeling, interested reader are referred to [41].
5The associated SNR threshold ρe is an optimization variable which is
introduced to control the information leakage levels at the eavesdroppers.
The D2D transmitter optimizes this variable to maximize its utility function.
We assume that he,k is i.i.d. complex Gaussian variable with
variance γ2e , and the entries of ge,kT are i.i.d. complex
Gaussian variables with variance δ2e . Thus, the secrecy outage
probability (9) can be derived as
pout = Pr{Cs −max
k
{Ce,k} < R}
= Pr{max
k
{Ce,k} > log(1 + ρe)}
= 1− Pr
{
max
k
{
ps(NT − 1)|he,k|2
PBS‖ge,kT‖2
}
≤ ρe
}
= 1−
[
Pr
(
ps(NT − 1)|he,k|2
PBS‖ge,kT‖2 ≤ ρe
)]K
= 1−
{
1−
[
1+ρe
(
PBSγ
2
e
psδ2e(NT−1)
)]1−NT}K
. (10)
From (10), we can observe that pout decreases and asymptot-
ically reaches zero when NT →∞.
Based on the energy transfer time allocation θ and secrecy
rate R, the secrecy throughput is defined as the average
number of confidential messages received at the D2D receiver
per unit time, and can be given as
Ts=(1−θ)R=(1−θ)
[
log
(
1+
ps|hs|2
σ2s
)
−log(1+ρe)
]
. (11)
III. GAME THEORETICAL BASED SECURE WIRELESS
POWERED D2D COMMUNICATIONS
In practice, both WET and WITCJ processes can belong
to different service providers and act strategically. Thus, the
D2D transmitter has to pay a price as incentive to the BS
for WET service to facilitate its secure communications. In
order to efficiently exploit the WET interaction between the
BS and the D2D transmitter, we model both WET and WITCJ
processes as a Stackelberg game, where two different schemes
are considered as energy trading and non-energy trading.
When the two WET and WITCJ processes belong to the same
service provider, we consider the third scheme called social
wellfare optimization.
A. Energy Trading based Stackelberg Game
In this subsection, we consider an energy trading framework
for the secure wireless-powered D2D CJ-aided network using
Stackelberg game. Particularly, the strategic interactions be-
tween the D2D network and the cellular network are taken into
consideration. In the formulated game, the D2D transmitter
plays a leader role who purchases the energy service from the
hybrid BS in cellular network by offering a price to guarantee
WET and secure WITCJ processes during time period T . The
D2D transmitter optimizes its energy price as well as energy
transfer time allocation to maximize its utility function. On the
other hand, the hybrid BS is modelled as the follower of this
game, which decides their optimal transmit powers based on
the energy price paid by the D2D transmitter to maximize its
own utility function. Letting λ denote the energy price released
by the D2D transmitter, mathematically, the payment to be
paid by the D2D transmitter to the BS can be expressed as
E(θ, λ, PBS) = λθPBS‖h‖2. (12)
Then, the utility function of the D2D transmitter can be defined
as the difference between the benefits of the achievable secrecy
throughput and its payment to the BS, which is given by
UL(θ, λ, PBS) = µTs − E, (13)
where µ > 0 is the gain per unit throughput for the D2D
transmitter. Thus, the optimization problem the D2D network
utility (leader-level game) is formulated as:
Leader Level
max
ps,λ,ρe,θ
UL(θ, λ, PBS), s.t. ρe ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, pout ≤ ε,
0 ≤ ps ≤ pmaxs , 0 < θ < 1. (14)
Note that the optimal value of θ can be neither 0 nor 1 as
both values result in zero secrecy throughput. Moreover, the
hybrid BS in the cellular network is modeled as the follower
who maximizes its own profit, which can be expressed as
UBS(θ, λ, PBS) = θ(λPBS‖h‖2 −F(PBS)), (15)
where F(PBS) is used to model the cost of the BS per unit
time for wirelessly charging. In this paper, we consider the
following quadratic model6 for the cost function of the PBs.
F(x) = Ax2 +Bx (16)
where A > 0 and B > 0 are constants.
Thus, the optimization problem for the hybrid BS or the
follower-level game is given by
Follower Level
max
PBS
UBS = λθPBS‖h‖2 − θ(AP 2BS +BPBS),
s.t. PBS ≥ 0. (17)
The Stackelberg game for the considered WPCN-aided secure
D2D network has been formulated by combining problems
(14) and (17).7 The D2D transmitter (the leader) aims to solve
the problem (14), whereas the BS (the follower) aims to solve
the problem (17). For this game, the subsequent part is to find
the Stackelberg equilibrium, which can be formally defined as:
Definition 1: Let (θopt, λopt) denote the solutions to the prob-
lem (14), while P
opt
BS represents the solution to the problem
(17), then, the tuple (θopt, λopt, P
opt
BS) is the Stackelberg equi-
librium of the formulated game provided that the following
conditions are satisfied
UL(θ
opt, λopt, P
opt
BS) ≥ UL(θ, λ, P optBS), (18)
UBS(θ
opt, λopt, P
opt
BS) ≥ UBS(θopt, λopt, PBS), (19)
for 0 < θ < 1, λ ≥ 0, and PBS ≥ 0.
Exploiting the Stackelberg equilibrium definition in Defi-
nition 1, we will derive the Stackelberg equilibrium of the
formulated game by analyzing the optimal strategies for the
D2D transmitter and the hybrid BS to maximize their own
6Note that the quadratic function shown in (16) has been applied in the
energy market to model the energy cost [42].
7Generally, the BS provides two services for the D2D pair: energy service
and CJ service. In our formulated game, the BS can release these two services
by one combined price. After receiving payment for the energy service, the
interference service will be included in the package offered by the BS. So the
interference service is used as incentive to attract energy buyers.
utility functions. It can be seen from (17) that for a given
energy price λ and the energy transfer time allocation θ, the
utility function of the BS is a quadratic function with respect
to PBS and the constraint is affine, which indicate that (17) is
a convex problem. Thus, the following lemma is required to
obtain its optimal solution:
Lemma 1: For given λ and θ, the optimal solution to (17)
can be achieved as
P
opt
BS =
[
λ‖h‖2 −B
2A
]+
. (20)
Proof: It can be verified that the problem (17) is convex
in terms of PBS . Thus, we take into account the first derivative
to the objective function in (17) equals to zero as
∂UBS
∂PBS
= λθ‖h‖2 − 2θAPBS − θB = 0,
⇒ PBS = λ‖h‖
2 −B
2A
. (21)
Combining with the condition PBS > 0, we have completed
the proof of Lemma 1.
Here, we first consider the optimal solutions to the SNR
threshold ρe and the D2D transmit power ps by the following
problem for the given λ, θ and PBS ,
max
ps,ρe
1+ ps|hs|
2
σ2
s
1+ρe
s.t. 0≤ps≤pmaxs , ρe≥0, pout≤ε. (22)
In order to obtain the optimal solutions to (22), the following
theorem is introduced:
Theorem 1: For given θ and PBS , the optimal transmit
power at the D2D transmitter p
opt
s and the eavesdroppers’
SNR threshold ρ
opt
e are expressed in terms of the closed-form
solution, respectively, as
popts =
θξPBS‖h‖2
1− θ , (23)
and
ρopte =
θξ‖h‖2(NT − 1){[1− (1− ε) 1K ]
1
1−NT − 1}δ2e
(1 − θ)γ2e
. (24)
Proof: First, we fix ps to obtain the solution to ρe from
(10), which is the function with respect to ps, as follows:
ρe(ps) =
(NT − 1){[1− (1− ε) 1K ]
1
1−NT − 1}δ2e
PBSγ2e
ps. (25)
It is noted from (22) that |hs|2 >
(NT−1){[1−(1−ε)
1
K ]
1
1−NT −1}δ2
e
PBSγ2e
for positive achievable
secrecy rate. The objective function in (22) is monotonically
increasing with respect to ps. Thus, the optimal p
opt
s for any
given energy transfer time allocation θ can be expressed as
popts =
θξPBS‖h‖2
1− θ . (26)
Replacing (25) with (26), we have the optimal solution ρ
opt
e in
(24).
Next, we solve the problem (14) by substituting PBS with
P
opt
BS given in (20). Based on Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, we
rewrite the optimization problem (14) with p
opt
s , P
opt
BS and ρ
opt
e
as follows:
max
λ,θ
UL(θ, λ) = µ(1− θ) log
(1 + θξP optBS‖h‖2|hs|2(1−θ)σ2
s
1 + ρopte
)
− λθP optBS‖h‖2
= µ(1 − θ)
[
log
(
1 +
θξ|hs|2
(1− θ)σ2s
λ‖h‖2 −B
2A
‖h‖2
)
− log(1 + ρopte )
]
− λθ
(
λ‖h‖2 −B
2A
)
‖h‖2,
= µ(1−θ)
[
log
(
1+
ξ|hs|2
(1− θ)σ2s
(
λθ‖h‖4
2A
− θB‖h‖
2
2A
))
− log(1 + ρopte )
]
− λ
2θ‖h‖4
2A
+
λθB‖h‖2
2A
,
s.t. λ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. (27)
From (27), it is hard to find the optimal expressions for θ
and λ at the same time due to the complexity of its objective
function. In order to tackle this issue, we optimally solve (27)
in two steps. We first find the optimal closed-form solution to
λ for a given θ. Then, the optimal value for θ can be obtained
via one-dimension line search. Now we rewrite (27) for a given
θ as
max
λ
UL(λ) = a
[
log(1 + d(λC − 2D))− log(1 + ρopte )
]
− λ2C + 2λD,
s.t. λ ≥ 0, (28)
where
C =
θ‖h‖4
2A
, D =
θB‖h‖2
4A
, a = µ(1− θ), d = ξ|hs|
2
(1− θ)σ2s
.
We solve problem (28) by introducing the following theorem:
Theorem 2: The optimal solution to problem (28) can be
derived as
λopt =
−(1− 3dD) +√(1− dD)2 + 2ad2C
2dC
. (29)
Proof: It is easily verified that the objective function in
(28) is a concave function, thus, in order to find the optimal
solution to λ, we consider its first-order derivatives that equals
to zero,
∂UL
∂λ
=
adC
1 + d(λC −D)− dD − 2λC + 2D = 0. (30)
After some mathematical simplifications, we have
2d(λC −D)2 + 2(1− dD)(λC −D)− adC = 0. (31)
Let x = λC −D, we get
2dx2 + 2(1− dD)x − adC = 0. (32)
The optimal solution to x is easily achieved by solving the
above equation. Thus, the associated optimal solutions to λ
can be derived as
λ1 =
−(1−3dD)+
√
(1−dD)2+2ad2C
2dC ,
λ2 =
−(1−3dD)−
√
(1−dD)2+2ad2C
2dC .
(33)
Now, let us verify the validity of both solutions shown in (33).
The objective function (28) includes the logarithm term, which
should be non-negative. Thus, we check the validity of these
solutions by substituting λ1 and λ2 into the logarithm term of
(28), respectively. We first check λ1 as follows:
1 + d
(−(1− 3dD) +√(1 − dD)2 + 2ad2C
2d
− 2D
)
= 1 + d
(−(1− dD) +√(1− dD)2 + 2ad2C
2d
)
> 1 + d
(−(1− dD) + |1− dD|
2d
)
≥ 1. (34)
Similarly, we check λ2 as
1 + d
(−(1− 3dD)−√(1 − dD)2 + 2ad2C
2d
− 2D
)
= 1 + d
(−(1− dD)−√(1− dD)2 + 2ad2C
2d
)
< 1 + d
(−(1− dD)− |1− dD|
2d
)
≤ 1. (35)
Thus, λ1 is a valid stationary point. Due to the concavity
of the objective function in (28), its second-order derivatives
with respective to λ is less than zero, which indicates that its
maximum value is the stationary point λ1. Also, it is easily
verified that λ1 > 0, which satisfied the constraint (28). Thus,
the optimal solution to the problem (28), denoted by λopt is
the stationary point λ1, which completes the proof.
We have already achieved the optimal energy price λopt of
the D2D transmitter for a given energy transfer time allocation
θ. Substituting λopt given in (29) into the problem (27), we
have the following problem regarding θ:
max
θ
UL(θ, λ
opt) = µ(1 − θ)
[
log
(
1 + t1
θ
1− θ
)
− log
(
1 + t2
θ
1− θ
)]
− θt3,
s.t. 0 < θ < 1, (36)
where
t1 =
ξ|hs|2(λopt‖h‖4 −B‖h‖2)
2Aσ2s
,
t2 =
ξ‖h‖2(NT − 1){[1− (1− ε) 1K ]
1
1−NT − 1}δ2e
γ2e
,
t3 =
λ2‖h‖4
2A
− λB‖h‖
2
2A
.
From (36), it can be seen that UL is a concave function with
respect to θ when t1 > t2 holds to guarantee the positive
achievable secrecy rate. Thus, (36) is a convex problem. In
order to obtain the optimal solution to θ, we consider the
following equation by taking the first-order derivative of UL
with respect to θ as
µ log
(
(t1 − 1)θ + 1
(t2 − 1)θ + 1
)
= µ(1− θ)
[
t1 − 1
(t1 − 1)θ + 1 −
t2 − 1
(t2 − 1)θ + 1
]
− t3. (37)
We set the left-hand-side (LHS) and right-hand-side (RHS) of
(37) as f(θ) and g(θ), respectively. It is easily shown that f(θ)
is monotonically increasing function with θ, whereas g(θ) is
monotonically decreasing function with θ. Thus, the optimal
solution of θ can be achieved by iteratively updating θ from the
initial value 0 to the value such that f(θ) = g(θ), which is of
lower complexity than one-dimensional (1D) line search. With
f(0) = 0, f(1) = µ log
(
t1
t2
)
> 0, g(0) = µ(t1− t2)− t3 > 0,
and g(1) = −t3 < 0, this optimal solution θopt > 0, located at
the intersection, is feasible, and also satisfies the constraint in
(36). Thus, we denote the optimal solution to (36) as follows:
θopt = arg max
θ∈(0,1)
UL(θ, λ
opt). (38)
With this we complete the derivation of the Stackelberg game’s
equilibrium (P optBS , λ
opt, θopt), which are presented in (20), (29),
and (38), respectively.
B. Non-Energy Trading based Stackelberg Game
In Section III-A, we formulate the energy trading between
the hybrid BS and the D2D transmitter. As a comparison, in
this subsection, we propose non-energy trading based Stack-
elberg game formulation to exploit the interaction between
the BS and the D2D transmitter with a fixed energy transfer
time allocation θ. In this game, the hybrid BS is modelled
as the leader who determines the energy price to maximize its
utility which is defined as the difference between the total D2D
transmitter payment and the quadratic energy cost shown in
(16). Thus, the leader level of this Stackelberg game is written
as8
Leader Level
max
λ
UBS = λθPBS‖h‖2 − θ(AP 2BS +BPBS),
s.t. λ ≥ 0. (39)
In addition, the D2D transmitter plays the follower’s role
to guarantee the secure communication by using the power
released by the BS, in which it aims to maximize the difference
between the benefit of the achievable secrecy throughput and
its payment to the BS for wireless power transfer. Thus, the
follower level of this Stackelberg game is given by
Follower Level
max
PBS ,ps,ρe
UL(θ, PBS , ps, ρe),
s.t. ρe ≥ 0, pout ≤ ε, 0 ≤ ps ≤ pmaxs , (40)
where
UL(θ, PBS , ps, ρe) = µTs − E
= µ(1− θ)
[
log
(
1 +
ps|hs|2
σ2s
)
− log(1 + ρe)
]
− λθPBS‖h‖2. (41)
8This leader level game is similar to the follower level of the energy trading
based Stackelberg game (17). The only difference between these two games
is that this leader game is to decide the energy price λ to maximize its utility,
whereas the follower game (17) determines the optimal transmit power PBS
to maximize its utility.
We first employ the same method to obtain the optimal
solutions p
opt
s , ρ
opt
e and θ
opt shown in Section III-A. Then, we
focus on the optimal solution of the BS transmit power by
solving problem (40). It can be verified that the utility function
in (41) is a concave function with respect to PBS . Now, we
set its first-order derivative equal to zero,
∂UL
∂PBS
=
µ(1− θ) ξθ‖h‖2|hs|2(1−θ)σ2
s
1 + ξθ‖h‖
2|hs|2
(1−θ)σ2
s
PBS
− λθ‖h‖2 = 0. (42)
After some mathematical derivations, the optimal power allo-
cation of the BS with respect to λ is given by
PBS(λ) =
[
µ(1− θ)
λθ‖h‖2 −
(1− θ)σ2s
ξθ‖h‖2|hs|2
]+
. (43)
Substituting (43) into (39) leads to the following:
UBS = λθ
(
µ(1− θ)
λθ‖h‖2 −
(1 − θ)σ2s
ξθ‖h‖2|hs|2
)
‖h‖2
− θA
(
µ(1− θ)
λθ‖h‖2 −
(1 − θ)σ2s
ξθ‖h‖2|hs|2
)2
− θB
(
µ(1 − θ)
λθ‖h‖2 −
(1− θ)σ2s
ξθ‖h‖2|hs|2
)
. (44)
The utility function (44) is a concave function with respect to
λ. Taking the first-order derivative to (44) equal to zero, we
get
∂UBS
∂λ
=−θY ‖h‖2−2θA
(
X
λ
−Y
)(
−X
λ2
)
−θB
(
−X
λ2
)
=0,
⇒ λ3 + 2AXY −BX
Y ‖h‖2 λ−
2AX2
Y ‖h‖2 = 0, (45)
where
X =
µ(1− θ)
θ‖h‖2 , Y =
(1− θ)σ2s
ξθ‖h‖2|hs|2 (46)
It is observed that (45) is a cubic equation, which can be solved
in terms of closed-form solution of x by using Cardano’s
formula [43],
λopt = ej∠λ1 3
√
|λ1|+ ej∠λ2 3
√
|λ2| − a
3
, (47)
where ∠ denotes the phase angle of a complex random
variable, and
λ1 = − q
2
+
√
∆, λ2 = − q
2
−
√
∆,
∆ =
p3
27
+
q2
4
, p = −a
2
3
+ b, q =
2a3
27
− ab
3
+ c,
a = 0, b =
2AXY −BX
Y ‖h‖2 , c = −
2AX2
Y ‖h‖2 .
Thus, the optimal power allocation of the BS can be achieved
by substituting (47) in (43) as
P
opt
BS =
[
µ(1− θ)
λoptθ‖h‖2 −
(1− θ)σ2s
ξθ‖h‖2|hs|2
]+
. (48)
Noted that for a fixed θ, both UBS and UL can be shown to
be the concave functions in terms of λ and PBS , respectively.
Thus, we have completed the derivations of the Stackelberg
equilibrium (λopt, P
opt
BS) for the formulated Stackelberg game
which are shown in (47) and (48), respectively.
C. Social Welfare Optimization
In the previous subsection, we solve the Stackelberg equi-
librium of the proposed game with energy trading. In order
to show the energy price loss of the D2D transmitter due to
the self-interested behaviors of the hybrid BS in the proposed
game-theoretical scheme, we investigate a social welfare opti-
mization scheme in this subsection. Specifically, we consider
that the cooperation between the D2D transmitter and the BS
aims to maximize the social welfare, which is defined as the
difference between the benefits obtained from the achievable
secrecy throughput at the D2D transmitter and the cost of
the BS. In this scenario, the energy transfer price will not be
considered. The social welfare optimization is done by jointly
optimizing the energy transfer time allocation and the transmit
power of the BS. Mathematically, the social welfare utility
function can be formulated as
Social Welfare
USW (θ, PBS , ps, ρe) = µTs − θ(AP 2BS +BPBS)
= µ(1− θ)
[
log
(
1 +
ps|hs|2
σ2s
)
− log(1 + ρe)
]
− θ(AP 2BS +BPBS). (49)
Thus, the social welfare maximization problem9 is given by
max
θ,PBS,ps,ρe
USW (θ, PBS , ps, ρe),
s.t. pout≤ε, ρe≥0, 0≤ps≤pmaxs , 0<θ<1. (50)
The problem (50) is not convex in terms of utility function.
To solve this problem, we consider the following steps:
1) We first obtain the optimal solutions i.e., p
opt
s and ρ
opt
e
via Theorem 1 shown in Section III-A.
2) Then, the optimal solution P
opt
BS is achieved by solving
the problem (50) for given ps and ρe.
3) Finally, the optimal energy time allocation θopt can be
achieved via the numerical search shown in Section
III-A.
In this subsection, we focus on the second step to obtain the
optimal power allocation of the BS. First, we fix ps and ρs
from Section III-A, then the utility function of social welfare
can be rewritten as
USW (θ, PBS) = µ(1− θ)
[
log
(
1 +
θξPBS‖h‖2|hs|2
(1 − θ)σ2s
)
− log(1+ρopte )
]
−θ(AP 2BS+BPBS). (51)
The above utility function is concave with respect to PBS
since its second-order derivatives is less than zeros. Then, take
the first-order derivative of the objective function to (50) with
respect to PBS for a given θ, and equal to zero as follows,
∂USW
∂PBS
=
ad
1 + dPBS
− 2θAPBS − θB = 0, (52)
9This social welfare scheme is considered as an alternative scenario where
the D2D transmitter and the BS are deployed and operated by the same service
provider.
where a = µ(1 − θ), and d = θξ‖h‖2|hs|2(1−θ)σ2
s
. After some
mathematical manipulations, (52) can be simplified as follows:
2θAdP 2BS + (2θA+ dBθ)PBS + (Bθ − ad) = 0. (53)
The optimal power allocation for the hybrid BS can be
expressed as
P
opt
BS=
[
−(2θA+dBθ)+√(2θA+dBθ)2−8θAd(Bθ−ad)
4θAd
]+
.
(54)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results to validate
the theoretical results for our proposed Stackelberg games.
In order to evaluate the performance of these schemes, we
consider a secure wireless-powered D2D communication sys-
tem shown in Fig. 1, which consists of a hybrid BS equipped
with five transmit antennas (NT = 5), a D2D pair, and two
eavesdroppers (K = 2). The maximum allowable secrecy
outage probability is ε = 0.1, and the energy harvesting
efficiency ξ = 0.8.
First, we validate the concavity of the energy trading based
utility function of the D2D transmitter shown in (36) with
respect to the energy transfer time allocation θ. Fig. 2 shows
the utility function versus the energy time allocation θ for
both energy trading and social welfare schemes. Additionally,
a numerical search is considered to obtain the optimal energy
transfer time allocation θopt. It is observed that their utility
functions are concave in term of θ with an optimal energy
price λopt. Moreover, the social welfare optimization scheme
achieves a higher utility value because two parties work
together for the social welfare purpose. This reflects the fact
that the hybrid BS is altruism for wireless energy transfer
in the social welfare scheme, whereas it is egoism (or self-
interested) in the energy trading based game, which has a
direct impact on the D2D transmitter. The same behaviours
can also be observed in Fig. 3 where the secrecy throughputs
for both energy trading and social welfare schemes are shown
versus the energy time allocation θ.
Next, the energy transfer price paid by the D2D transmitter
to the hybrid BS is evaluated for both the energy trading and
non-energy trading schemes in Fig. 4. From this result, we can
observe that the energy transfer price of both energy trading
and non-energy trading schemes is a decreasing function of
θ. This is because of the fact that in this energy interaction
with a given time resource of T , if more time is spent on
energy harvesting, i.e., larger θ, then less time is spent on
information transfer, i.e., smaller (1− θ). Given that the same
energy service is purchased by the D2D network, the larger
θ value would then lead to the lower price to be paid by the
D2D transmitter. In addition, it can also be observed that non-
energy trading scheme needs to pay a higher price than the
energy trading scheme, which highlights the advantage of the
energy trading scheme where the customer can negotiate and
decide the optimal trading price.
We also evaluate the transmit power performance, i.e., the
BS’s and the D2D transmit power, for the three schemes. Fig.
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Fig. 3: Secrecy throughput versus θ.
5 plots the BS/D2D transmit power, i.e., PBS or ps, versus θ.
It shows that the BS’s transmit power, i.e., PBS , for these three
schemes decreases as θ increases, whereas the D2D’s transmit
power, i.e., ps, increases with θ. This implies that the BS
requires a lower level of power to support the wireless charging
for the D2D transmitter when the WET time allocation θ
increases, while the D2D transmitter would have more power
available to support the secure D2D communication as the
WIT time allocation (1 − θ) decreases. It is noted that the
D2D transmitter can initially employ the increasing available
power to improve the secrecy rate, i.e. increase its utility UL.
However, if the D2D’s transmit power keeps increasing further
as θ rises beyond the optimal value, c.f. θopt in Fig. 2, the
secrecy worsens because the information now becomes more
vulnerable to the eavesdropper at high power. This reflects the
concave behavior of the utility functions as discussed earlier.
Fig. 6 shows the utility function versus EH efficiency ξ,
where the utility functions increase with ξ. Fig. 6(a) shows
that the social welfare optimization scheme outperforms the
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energy trading scheme in terms of utility function. In addition,
our proposed scheme, i.e., θopt, has a higher utility than the
fixed θ based scheme. In Fig. 6(b), we compare both energy
trading and social welfare schemes against the non-energy
trading scheme with θ = 0.5. As seen in Fig. 6(b), both energy
trading and social welfare optimization schemes outperform
the non-energy trading scheme in terms of D2D user’ utility
function as the EH efficiency ξ increases. This is because of
the fact that the D2D users cannot negotiate the price nor
can they dictate the energy market when the leader BS decide
every things in the first place, which can happen in a monopoly
situation when there is only one energy seller.
Fig. 7 shows the hybrid BS transmit power PBS versus
the EH efficiency ξ for the proposed schemes. It is clear
from this figure that both energy trading and social welfare
schemes increases with ξ in terms of the BS transmit power
(PBS) and asymptotically stable in the high EH efficiency
regime, whereas the non-energy trading scheme first increases
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Fig. 7: PBS vs ξ.
with ξ and then decreases after ξ ≈ 0.2 in terms of the BS
transmit power. In addition, the BS transmits more power
in non-energy trading scheme than energy trading scheme
in the low EH efficiency regime. However, this trend is
reversed as ξ increases in the high EH efficiency regime.
This is because of the fact that the non-energy trading scheme
needs more power to support the D2D transmitter to facilitate
its secure communications in the low EH efficiency regime.
Moreover, Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(b) also show that the larger µ,
the more power the BS releases to support the D2D secure
transmissions.
Fig. 8 shows the energy transfer price paid by the D2D
transmitter with different ξ. It can be observed from this figure
that the energy trading scheme pays less energy price than the
non-energy trading scheme, which indicates that the energy
trading interaction between the BS and the D2D transmitter
can play a cost-efficiency role. In addition, for the energy
trading scheme, the larger θ is required, the less energy price
the D2D transmitter pays.
Fig. 9 illustrates the secrecy throughput performance versus
the energy harvesting efficiency ξ. It is clear from this figure
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Fig. 8: Energy transfer price versus ξ.
that the secrecy throughput increases with ξ, which implies
that the secrecy transmission between the D2D pair is guaran-
teed by improving the energy harvesting efficiency. In addition,
both social welfare and energy trading schemes outperform
the non energy trading scheme in terms of secrecy throughput,
which highlight the advantage of the energy trading interaction
between the WET and the D2D network.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Se
cr
ec
y 
th
ro
ug
hp
ut
Energy trading
Social welfare
Non energy trading (  = 0.5)
Fig. 9: Secrecy throughput versus ξ.
In Fig. 10, we evaluate the utility function with different
jamming signal variances δ2e . It is shown that the utility
function for all the proposed schemes decreases monotonically
as δ2e increases. In addition, the social welfare scheme outper-
forms the energy trading scheme. Moreover, we compare both
optimal schemes with the fixed θ scheme. The results indicate
that the optimal schemes have higher utility functions than
the schemes with θ = 0.5. It can be observed that both the
energy trading and social welfare schemes outperforms the
non-energy trading scheme in terms of utility function when
θ = 0.5. This result confirms that the social welfare scheme
gives a better performance because all parties work together in
a social corporate responsibility manner. Interestingly, similar
behaviours of the proposed schemes can also be seen from Fig.
11 where we evaluate the secrecy performance with different
jamming signal variances δ2e .
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Then, we evaluate the WET time allocation with the EH
efficiency ξ in Fig. 12. It can be observed that the optimal
WET time allocation monotonically decreases with ξ. This
is due to a fact that the WET phase requires less time to
transfer power as the EH efficiency ξ increases. It is clear that
social welfare scheme outperforms the energy trading scheme
in terms of the optimal WET time allocation. Furthermore, the
larger µ is, the smaller the WET time is required.
Finally, the utility function versus the number of the eaves-
dropper K is evaluated in Fig. 13. From this result, it is
observed that the utility function decreases as K increases. In
addition, we compare the three proposed schemes where the
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Fig. 12: Optimal energy time allocation θopt versus ξ.
social welfare scheme outperforms the energy trading scheme.
The non-energy trading scheme demonstrates the worst utility
among these three schemes, which implies that the non-energy
trading scheme does not provide any advantage for the D2D
users when they act as a passive customer in an environment
where the leader BS can decide the energy price in a monopoly
manner, particularly when the number of eavesdroppers are
large.
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V. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated a secure wireless-powered CJ-aided
D2D communication system, where a hybrid BS in a cellular
network provides power wirelessly for the D2D transmitter
and at the same time plays a CJs role to interfere with the
eavesdroppers to support the secure D2D communications.
We have formulated different scenarios and solved different
problems of energy interactions using the Stackeberg game.
We found that a higher utility level is achieved if social welfare
responsibility is taken into account. This is understandable, as
all parties work together to maximize a common target. At
the same time, the energy buyer, i.e., the D2D user, would
have to pay a higher price for energy purchase if the seller,
i.e., the BS, has a monopoly authority to dictate and lead the
market, as shown in the non-energy trading scenario. However,
in an environment where there are potential competitors for
energy selling, the D2D customer can become the leader
who would negotiate for a much better energy price, as
reflected in the energy trading case of our proposed game.
In addition, numerical results were provided to validate our
proposed schemes and showed that both energy trading and
social welfare schemes provide a better energy cost efficiency.
Overall, the results highlighted the importance of the energy
trading interactions between the cellular and D2D networks.
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